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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The language is almost identical and provides as follows: 
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
person or things to be seized. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Defendant 
argued the police did not have authority to enter his private residence. The cause 
asserted by the City was that officers were responding to a dispatch call of a 
possible altercation between two males. Both males exited the home and were 
interviewed by police. The police speculated that others may be in the home and 
searched the home based on officer safety concerns and the supposed concern for 
others that might be in the home. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Defendant entered a Sery plea reserving the right to appeal this 
particular issue—the denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On November 4,2007, Officers (3) from Spanish Fork City and one additional 
officer from the Utah County Sheriffs Department responded to a call referencing an 
altercation between two males at a Spanish Fork residence. (Suppression Hearing 
(SH) page 6/ page 14 L. 12-14 )The call did not indicate more excepting a possible 
altercation. (SH 6 L 3). There was no suggestion made of the nature of incident nor 
the presence of any weapons.( SH 6 L. 13) 
The Spanish Fork officers arrived at the approximate location of the reported 
altercation to hear sounds of two people shouting. The sounds were coming from the 
basement area of the defendant's home. (SH 7 L. 8/ L. 15-19 
The officers reported hearing something being hitting against a window. (SH 7 
L. 23-24). The officers speculated that something was thrown against a wall. (SH 15 
L24) 
The officers knocked on the front door to the home. After a delay, the door 
was opened. Both males came out—pulled out. (SH 16 L. 9-12) Two dogs emerged 
from the residence. The defendant secured the dogs in the back yard of the home. 
(SH 9 L. 2-12). Both individuals were handcuffed and detained. (SH 9 L. 25) (SH 9 L. 
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13-16). No weapons were found on either person. (SH 20 L. 6) Both were 
questioned and both advised that they had been drinking and had returned home 
and had a verbal altercation. (SH 17 L. 3-5). However, this discussion occurred after 
the officers had entered the home and searched. (SH 18 L. 15) 
The officers knew that they had the two person noted in the dispatch call 
outside the home. (SH17L 13) 
The officers sought permission to enter the home but were refused by both 
persons, including the defendant Taylor. 
The officers entered the home for reportedly officer safety concerns and 
concern for others. (SH 10 L. 7-14/ Page 19 L. 13-14). However, the officers knew 
that the report was based on two males in a possible altercation. (SH 15 L. 1-3). 
They knew the noise coming from within the home was from two persons. (SH 15 L. 
8). The basis to enter the home was based on speculation that something still could 
be going on in the home. (SH 17 L. 15-18/ Page 18 L 24 - Page 19 L. 5) The only 
other noise being heard was the two dogs that had run from the house and these 
were secured by Mr. Taylor. (SH 17 L 20) 
Neither person was arrested by the officers at this time. There were no further 
indications of any other persons being in the home. (SH 10 L 9/ Page 13 L. 8). 
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There was no information that any physical blows had been exchanged between 
either party. There was no information that any property had been destroyed. 
The contraband was located in a little box that was opened up and found 
therein. (SH 12 L 23-24). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The chief protection granted by both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution and Art I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is to prevent the physical 
entry into a private residence. Absent a search warrant, officers may not search the 
residence of a citizen. The only exception to such a prohibition is the presence of 
'imperative cause' justifying an immediate entrance. 
The Spanish Fork police officers here justified the entrance based on the 
speculation that someone else may be in the home and under the guise of 'officer 
safety'. Both concerns are based on officer speculation without any particularized 
basis. 
ARGUMENT 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
The "'physical entry of the home is the chief evil, against which the wording 
of the Fourth Amendment is directed."' Accordingly, warrantless entries are 
presumptively unreasonable. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. 551, 559 (2004) (quoting; 
United States v. Saadeh. 61 F.3d 510, 516 (7th Cir.1995); Pavton v. New York, 445 
U.S. 573, 585-86, 100 S.Ct. 1371,63 LEd.2d 639 (1980), quoting United States v. 
United States District Court. 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 
(1972). State v.Duran, 2005 UT App 409,131 P.3d 246; State v. Duran, 2007 UT 
23,156P.3d795. 
In recognition of this right, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that officers, 
even with an arrest warrant, cannot cross the threshold of the home to execute the 
warrant. Pavton v. New York 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Police cannot enter a home to 
arrest a suspected drunk driver, notwithstanding the existence of outright probable 
cause and the immediacy of the officer's pursuit. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 
749,104 S.Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984). See Commonwealth v. Kiser, 48 
Mass. App. Ct. 647 (2000), 724 N.E.2d 348. 
In State v. Duran 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795, the Utah Supreme Court 
precluded officers from entering a home based on the detection of the odor of 
marijuana being consumed. The Duran Court found few exceptions exists to 
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authorize entry without a warrant: In absence of "specially pressing or urgent law 
enforcement need", a warrant is mandated. 
In State v. Beavers, Ct. App. Utah 1993,859 P.2d 9, this Court found the 
Fourth Amendment prohibits a warrantless entry into a private residence where the 
officers possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. This is 
supported by State v. Duran, 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795. Here in the present 
setting, the officers had no exigency. The officers speculated that someone else 
possibly may be still in the home. 
This Court in State v. South. 885 P.2d 795,800 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), rev'd 
on other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996) recognized this danger when they 
found that "the mere possibility that evidence may be destroyed" does not justify a 
warrantless entry. 
In South, a police detective went to the defendant's home to investigate the 
theft. While interviewing defendant at the door, he detected a heavy odor of burnt 
marijuana. Based on that observation, he obtained a warrant to search the home and 
returned with three other officers. The defective warrant only authorized the search 
of the defendant, but not of the home. The State claimed that, even though the 
11 
warrant was defective, the warrantless search was justified by exigent 
circumstances; the consumption of the burning marijuana. 
The South Court balanced the State's interest there finding it did not 
outweigh the societal interest in prohibiting warrantless searches of homes. 
In State v. Cushinq. 2003 Ut. App. 335,79 P.3d 962, this Court found illegal 
the entry into the apartment to search for suspected contraband even though officers 
observed Cushing unexpectedly jumped out of the car and run into an apartment. 
The officer surmised that Cushing was attempting to evade detection of contraband 
or to obtain a weapon inside the apartment. After some warning, Cushing exited the 
apartment, was handcuffed and placed in a patrol car. The officers then searched 
the apartment locating contraband. This Court found the search into the apartment 
illegal and suppressed. 
This Court noted: 
I t is settled doctrine that probable cause for belief that certain 
articles subject to seizure are in a dwelling cannot of itself 
justify a search without a warrant.'" . . . If probable cause to 
believe a search of the home will yield evidence of contraband 
is insufficient, then reasonable suspicion certainly will not do: 
EXCEPTIONS 
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The Supreme Court in Duran noted the danger of expanding the justification 
for warrantless searches. The Court feared officers would exploit any exception 
grant to conduct warrantless searches in other contexts. They held at page 798: 
We also decline to sanction the warrantless search in 
this context because we fear that it would be difficult to leash 
warrantless searches in other contexts in which consumption and 
destruction of evidence merge. It is certainly not far-fetched 
to envision law enforcement officers exploiting the rationale 
that consumption of contraband is also evidence destruction to 
justify warrantless searches in other contexts. After all, the 
exigency present here is not appreciably different from a 
report of consumption of alcohol by underage persons in a 
dwelling. Like smoking marijuana, underage drinking is a 
jailable offense crime in which the criminal act involves 
simultaneous consumption of contraband and destruction of 
evidence. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 32A-12-104, -209(1) 
(2005). Also, olfactory-based probable cause could, 
under a doctrine that equated consumption of contraband with 
destruction of evidence, permit a law enforcement officer to 
claim exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search to 
apprehend eighteen-year-olds believed to be smoking tobacco. 
This Court has been cautious in the expansion of any exception; particularly 
the 'emergency aide doctrine'. Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, fl 12, 
994 P,2d 1283. 
The Court recognized the likelihood of misuse of the 'emergency aid 
doctrine', finding the emergency aid entry justified only where there is "some reliable 
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and specific indication of the probability that a person is suffering from a serious 
physical injury." Salt Lake City v. Davidson at fl 20. The Court cautioned that an 
intrusions to administer aid to less severe injuries than serious bodily injury may 
render unconstitutional a search or seizure made incident to the warrantless entry. 
See also Holmes v. State, 347 Ark. 530 (2002) 65 S.W.3d 860; People v. Smith, 40 
P.3d 1287 (Colorado 2002). 
A similar case to the present is State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227,666 P.2d 802, 
812 (1983) (en banc). There police responded to a reported fight at a motel. Id. 666 
P.2d at 804. Upon arrival, police were informed that there was an ongoing rape in a 
specific room, but when police knocked on the door the purported victim emerged 
fully clothed and apparently unfrightened. Police talked with defendant for a moment 
and noticed an empty holster protruding from a backpack on the bed. The officers 
restrained defendant in the motel room and in the ensuing search found a gun and 
drugs. Noting that any emergency with respect to the woman had clearly ended, the 
Davis court rejected the State's claims that an emergency required police to enter 
and search the room for their own safety as argued by the City here. 
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EXIGENT CIRCUMSTGANCES 
As noted by the Utah Courts, the government bears the particularly heavy 
burden of proving the warrantless entry into a home falls within the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 
13 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). State v. Duran. 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795. 
"Exigent circumstances are those 'that would cause a reasonable person to 
believe that entry.. . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other 
persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some 
other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.'" United 
States v. McConnev. 728 F,2d 1195,1199 (9th Cir. 1984) State v. Duran. 2005 UT 
App 409 131 P.3d 246: State v. Duran. 2005 UT App 409,131 P.3d 246; State v. 
Duran, 2007 UT 23,156 P.3d 795.; State v. South. 885 P.2d 795 (Utah Ct.App. 
1994), rev'd on other grounds, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996). 
A recent decision by the Oregon Court is State v. Bentz, 211 Or App 129,, 
158 P3d 1081. There a police officer received a call stating that, moments earlier, 
someone had observed a man putting a gun into his waistband and entering an 
apartment. Officers responded finding three or four people sitting or standing just 
inside the door, one of whom matched the description given by the caller. Two 
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officers began walking toward the front door of the apartment with their guns drawn. 
As they approached, defendant's brother ran into the apartment. Slyter yelled at him 
to stop, but he did not. At that point, the man who matched the description given by 
the caller spun around and faced Slyter. Slyter "took him down" at gunpoint, and the 
other officer patted him down and found a pistol in a holster on Ward's right side. 
They also found methamphetamine on his person. 
The officer believed that defendant's brother who had run into the 
apartment could be hiding a gun in the apartment. Slyter yelled into the apartment for 
"somebody to come out of the apartment." After about five minutes of continued 
yelling, Rubin and a woman, Lohr, came out of the apartment. By then, three or four 
additional police officers had arrived on the scene. Officers asked if there was 
anyone else in the apartment, and they both said no. One person indicated that her 
two small children were in the apartment. The officer entered the apartment finding 
defendant and another woman sitting in the living room. They remained seated when 
he walked in. The police officers arrested him and conducted a search of his person 
before transporting the person in a police vehicle. The search discovered a small 
bag containing methamphetamine. Defendant challenged the search. 
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The Oregon Court found the search illegal and suppressed although the 
State argued that exigent circumstances existed to enter the apartment. The Court 
found no imperative to enter the apartment. See also People v. Plante, 3-05-0075 
(III.App. 1-26-2007); State v. Schwartz, 261 Ga. App. 742 (2003) 583 S.E.2d 573. 
State v. Pando, A06A1984 (Ga.App. 3-8-2007). State v. Guqqenmos, A133266 
(Or.App. 2-11-2009). 
TIME TO PROCURE WARRANT 
Other Courts, including Utah, have required the City to demonstrate that the 
procurement of a warrant was not feasible because the exigencies of the situation 
made the chosen course imperative. State v. Lorocco, 794 P.2d 460,470-71 (Utah 
1990) (safety of police and risk of loss of evidence); State v. Limb, 581 P,2d 142, 
144 (Utah 1978) (risk of loss of evidence); State v. Parker, 399 So,2d 24, 28 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1981); Vasquez v. State, 870 So.2d 26 (Fla.App. 2 Dist. 2003). 
The City offered no evidence justifying the immediate entry absent the time 
and need to obtain a warrant. 
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POSSIBLITY OF STAKING OUT THE HOME 
The Beaver Court noted that the risk of harm to others is diminished in the 
residential setting because if the person police wish to question a person located in a 
dwelling they can generally be staked out until the person emerges, if a polite knock 
at the door fails to produce a suspect willing to voluntarily answer police inquiries. 
The Beaver Court would suggest that police follow the dictates of U.C.A. 77-7-8. 
These same concerns were also addressed in the recent decision in State v. Duran. 
In Illinois v . McArther, 531 U.S. 326 (2001), the Supreme Court found it 
reasonable to detain a homeowner while they secured his residence to obtain a 
search warrant. They found the detention pending the search warrant authorization 
was reasonable since police had probable cause to believe that the trailer home 
contained evidence of a crime and contraband; they spoke with the defendant's wife 
and made a very rough assessment of her reliability that drugs were within the 
trailer; they had a valid reason to fear that, unless restrained, the drugs would be 
destroyed; police made reasonable efforts to reconcile the law enforcement needs 
with the demands of defendant's personal privacy; they neither searched the trailer 
nor arrested McArthur before obtaining a warrant. Rather, they imposed a 
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significantly less restrictive restraint, preventing him from entering the trailer 
unaccompanied. They left his home and his belongings intact — until a neutral 
Magistrate, finding probable cause, issued a warrant. The detention was for a limited 
period of time. 
ENTRY INTO HOME TO INVESTIGATE MISDEMEANOR 
Writing in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), Justice Jackson 
explained why a warrantless home entry should be severely restricted : 
"Even if one were to conclude that urgent circumstances 
might justify a forced entry without a warrant, 
no such emergency was present in this case. This 
method of law enforcement displays a shocking lack of 
all sense of proportion. Whether there is reasonable 
necessity for a search without waiting to obtain a warrant 
certainly depends somewhat upon the gravity of the 
offense thought to be in progress as well as the hazards 
of the method of attempting to reach it It is to me a 
shocking proposition that private homes, even quarters 
in a tenement, may be indiscriminately invaded at the 
discretion of any suspicious police officer engaged in following 
up offenses that involve no violence or threats of it When an 
officer undertakes to act as his own magistrate, he ought to be 
in a position to justify it by pointing to some real immediate 
and serious consequences if he postponed action to 
get a warrant." Id., at 459-460 
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Other Courts including Utah refuse to permit warrantless home arrests for 
misdemeanor crimes and even some felonies. See, e. g., State v. Guertin, 190 
Conn. 440,453,461 A.2d 963,970 (1983) (The exception is narrowly drawn to 
cover cases of real and not contrived emergencies. The exception is limited to the 
investigation of serious crimes; misdemeanors are excluded"); People v. Strelow, 96 
Mich. App. 182,190-193, 292 N.W.2d 517,521-522 (1980). See also People v. 
Sanders, 59 III. App.3d 6,374 N.E.2d 1315 (1978) (burglary without weapons not 
grave offense of violence for this purpose); State v. Bennett, 295 N.W.2d 5 (S. D. 
1980) (distribution of controlled substances not a grave offense for these purposes). 
See also People v. Allison. 86 P.3d 421,423-24 (Colo. 2004), wherein the 
police responded to a 911 hang-up call, removed a married couple with slight facial 
injuries, and then re-entered their residence to look for other victims. In holding that 
the emergency aid doctrine did not apply, the court found it significant that the police 
did not ask the couple if anyone needed medical assistance before entering the 
home. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-8 (2003) (officer must demand admission and 
explain purpose for entering before making a forcible entry to a building or dwelling in 
order to arrest an occupant) and § 77-23-210 (2003) (officer must give notice of 
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authority and purpose before executing search warrant). 
PROTECTIVE SWEEPS 
"Protective Sweeps" is a recognized but limited exception to the Fourth 
Amendment. The Courts balance the need for officer safety against the need to 
constrain officers from circumventing privacy rights. The Courts recognize that the 
desire to investigate maybe camouflaged as a disguised 'officer safety' claim. 
It is not a justification to go beyond locked rooms. It is not an excuse to enter 
a home. Here the officers were limited to the immediate area (outside the home). 
U.S. V. Wilson. 36 F.3d 1298,1305-07 (5* Cir. 1994). U.S. v. Arch. 7 F.3d 1300, 
1303 (7th Cir. 1993). It cannot be used to condone a protective search for 
investigative purposes only. U.S.VOguns. 921 F.2d 442,447 (2nd Cir. 1990). 
In State v. Beavers, the Court advised that officers cannot enter a home based on 
reasonable suspicion. There must be more. 
ARTICULABLE FACTS 
The belief alone that contraband may be present cannot serve as a basis for 
a warrantees entry and search. U.S. v. Anderson, 981 F2d 1560,1568 (10th Cir. 
1992). In State v. Beavers. 859 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1993), the court concluded the 
mere possibility that a suspect may have a weapon or that evidence might be 
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destroyed is not enough to fall under the 'protective sweep' doctrine. State v. Palmer, 
803 P.2d at 1253. See also United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045,1049 (9th Cir. 
1993) (stating police must have "reasonable belief that exigent circumstances exist); 
United States v. Roark, 36 F.3d 14,17 (6th Cir. 1994) (rejecting exigent 
circumstances claim based solely on "unsubstantiated suspicions" of police officer 
who feared removal of marijuana). See United States v. Napue. 834 F.2d 1311,1327 
(7th Cir. 1987) (recognizing possibility that officers "suspected, or had reason to 
suspect," that hotel room was occupied, but concluding "the government did not offer 
evidence at the suppression hearing to support such a suspicion"). Because "there is 
almost always a partisan who might destroy or conceal evidence," United States v. 
Davis, 423 F.2d 974,979 (5th Cir. 1970), the State must show more than "a mere 
possibility that evidence might be removed," People v. Blasius, 435 Mich. 573,459 
N.W.2d 906,916 (Mich. 1990). The State failed to present evidence "that even 
intimated that the officers reasonably believed that destruction, removal or 
concealment of contraband material was imminent or threatened." State v. Peterson, 
525 S.W.2d 599,607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
In State v. Grossi, 2003 Ut. App. 181, 72 P.3d 686, officers learned of via a 
call that two women were being assaulted. When the officer arrived, one woman ran 
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toward him and told him that the defendant had dragged here friend by the hair into 
the basement apartment where he was assaulting her. The officer knocked on the 
apartment door and the defendant appeared at the window. He initially refused to 
answer the door. The defendant then yelled to the alleged victim and told her to tell 
the officer that she was alright. The officer heard nothing. Defendant then reported 
that he would send the victim out the cellar door. The defendant eventually came 
out. The officer also learned that the purported victim exited the apartment through 
the cellar door and ran northbound. 
The defendant wanted to secure his apartment after the officer arrested 
him. The officer then refused to allow Grossi to do so. The officer then entered the 
apartment under the guise of locating a key to lock the door. As the officer entered 
the home, another female came out of the bedroom. She was trying to get her cat. 
After conducting this pat down, the officer decided to secure the remainder of the 
apartment. When he looked in the bedroom, he saw multiple drug items in plain 
view. The officers seized the items and Defendant was charged with four drug 
related counts. 
The Court's analysis relied on Maryland v. Buie. 494 U.S. 325, 331, 
110 S.Ct. 1093,1096(1990). Citing Buie they reported: 
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"A 'protective search' is a quick and limited search of premises, 
incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of 
police officers or others. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327,110 S.Ct. at 
1094. An officer must have a "reasonable belief based on 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warranted] the 
officer in believing that the area swept harbored an individual 
posing a danger to the officer or others." Id. at 327,.. .the mere 
possibility of such a presence is not enough." Haves v. State, 
797 P.2d 962. 967 (Nev. 1990). 
The court's analysis turned on the fact that the alleged suspect, was 
already in police custody and not a threat to anyone. While Karren appeared in the 
apartment unexpectedly, and was nervous, she was not known to be violent, to carry 
a weapon, or to have access to a weapon. Based on these facts, the protective 
sweep was not justified and found the evidence should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed. Mr. Taylor had the right to deny officer's 
entrance into his home. This right is of constitutional significance and may not be 
overcome by a speculation that others may be yet in the house. 
The only time an entrance has been authorized without warrant is where 
the circumstance making immediate entrance imperative. Here, the officer's 
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speculation about the possibility of others being in the home does not justify 
entrance 
Dated this 12th day of Marcl; 
,arter 
Attorney for Defendant 
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